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What Can Play: 
The Potential of Non-Human Players 
Kara Stone 
Abstract: What can post-humanism teach us about game design? This paper questions the line 
drawn between what species and matter can play and what cannot play. Combining works by 
scholars of feminist post-humanism, new materialism, and game studies, primarily Jane Bennett, 
Donna Haraway, and T.L. Taylor, it proposes that play is a form of communication not only 
between animals and humans but also between plants and cyborgs, insects and atoms. Beginning 
by interrogating the borders of the human that have been built on ableist and racist discourses, 
this paper moves towards considering the human as interspecies and outlines that we must 
reassess the ways in which a multiplicity of species experience the intra-action that constitutes 
“play.” With a brief look into the history of defining play in both game studies and animal studies 
and their small crossover, play is reconfigured into an outlook or an approach rather than a set 
of rules. It is a drive that all species and matter experience, including insects, bacteria, and metal. 
This moves us beyond considering solely the materiality of our bodies at play by reconsidering 
the objects of play as our co-players, as matter with agential force. I argue that we need to 
reconsider the videogame player as an interspecies being, an assemblage of human and non-
human bodies. The de-anthropocentricization of the popular notions of player agency allows for 
a multiplicity of reactions not created in the linear cause and effect course, the belief in ultimate 
player control within procedural systems, which dominates game studies. This paper concludes 
by submitting possibilities of what considering the non-human through a feminist and anti-
ableist lens can offer game designers, players, and critics, such as considering the material 
platform’s impact on play, reforming the individualistic agency of players, and designing for the 
Other(s).  
 
Under late-capitalism, play must be productive. There is a push for games and 
play scholars to prove that play is useful to our lives under neoliberalism. If it 
does not benefit us in the workplace, then there is no point. We are left to write 
papers and attend conferences about how play is the key to social development, 
to a better workforce, to changing the world in a positive way. So too for animals; 
if play is not reinforcing social dynamics, or preparation for battle, then all the 
scientists, hard and soft, are mystified. In “What’s the Point If We Can’t Have 
Fun?” David Graeber writes in The Baffler, “Why do animals play? Well, why 
shouldn’t they? The real questions, according to Graeber, are: Why does the 
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existence of action carried out for the sheer pleasure of acting, the exertion of 
powers for the sheer pleasure of exerting them, strike us as mysterious? What 
does it tell us about ourselves that we instinctively assume that it is? In game 
studies, animals have been used to naturalize our play. In his beginning chapter 
of Homo Ludens, Johan Huizinga writes: 
Play is older than culture, for culture, however inadequately defined, always 
presupposes human society, and animals have not waited for man to teach 
them their playing. We can safely assert, even, that human civilization has 
added no essential feature to the general idea of play. Animals play just like 
men. We have only to watch young dogs to see that all the essentials of human 
play are present in their merry gambols. (1) 
For Huizinga, there is a “primordial” quality of play as demonstrated by the 
“simple” playing of animals (3). Mary Flanagan writes that “[p]lay is recognized 
as one of the most fundamental aspects of the human condition” (4). Katie Salen 
and Eric Zimmerman state that “communication theorists tell us that play is a 
form of metacommunication far preceding language in evolution because it is 
also found in animals” (302). Here, any form of animal communication is seen as 
lesser, primitive, and less evolved than ways in which humans communicate. 
Non-human species are most often cited within game studies to allude to the 
desired ubiquity and normality of play. The act of viewing particular animal 
behaviour and applying it to humans is a common problematic hazard. As trans-
animal scholar Myra J. Hird points out, animal morphology and behaviour are 
cited only to confirm our assumptions and desired beliefs about nature. People 
look for things they want or expect to see and then use specific animals to give 
a basis for the construction of the “natural”—most often, patriarchal social 
hierarchies, heterosexuality, able-bodiedness and able-mindedness, and white 
supremacy. In game studies, animals are largely used as “proof” that play is 
fundamental to the human experience, a part of nature. This line of thinking 
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reifies the nature/culture dichotomy, situating animals as solely in the realm of 
nature. Yet as Donna Haraway argues, there can be no true distinction between 
the natural and the cultural, instead favouring the term “naturecultures” 
(Companion Species… 3). As much as play and game scholars need to incorporate 
animals and different species into our critical thinking about play, we cannot 
witness their behaviours and apply them directly to humans, and we cannot look 
at the non-human as natural and culture-free. Instead of spending this essay 
critiquing game studies for its lack, I will turn to different disciplines and their 
gestures to play and playfulness in order to discover what they have to offer game 
criticism and design. I will primarily cite scholars working in affect, science 
studies, disability studies, the post-human and non-human, alongside game 
scholars such as Hannah Wirman, Mary Flanagan, and T.L. Taylor who have 
produced research inspired by these fields. This is because I want to explore 
something different, away from naturalizing discourses and away from proving 
the worth of play that takes up so much of game studies. I am not suggesting 
that this work has absolutely no use or benefit, but it is emblematic of a larger 
trend in the field of not interrogating anthropocentrism and the de-politicization 
of play. In this paper, I wish to step towards different possibilities of what it 
means to play, which species humans allow to play, and what game designers 
and scholars can take away from considering the non-human. 
Fetch is the most obvious game we play with animals. A human throws a 
ball, and the dog retrieves it, returning it to the human for another throw. Dogs 
are what Haraway calls a “companion species,” species that coexist (“Training” 
454); she writes extensively on playing with her dog, Cayenne: “Play is the 
something that is neither one nor two, which brings us into the open where 
purposes and functions are given a rest” (458). Games scholar Hanna Wirman 
argues that play can bring species closer together, describing play as “an 
equalizing plane that can help cross-species communication […]. In play, both 
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parties forget their power status and get lost in play” (n.p.). But how do different 
species communicate that they are playing in a way that is intelligible to the 
other? Consent is one of the most important factors, if not the most important, 
distinguishing what is play from what is not. Without voluntary action and 
consent, play can become the receiving end of cruelty, transforming us into play 
objects rather than players. How do humans and other species give consent to 
play? In fetch, for example, a dog may pick up the ball and give it to the human, 
or a human might wave the ball in the dog’s face to see if they are interested. It 
is not always so easy. Without a play object to bring out, like a ball or yarn, how 
do we communicate consent, boundaries, and rules without verbal language? 
Wirman calls this sort of communication “meta-communication” (n.p.). Animals 
have play-initiating signals that are species-specific and are not straightforward 
to adopt. It may be showing docility like presenting their stomach and retracting 
claws. Facial expressions communicate playfulness too. Usually this meta-
communication is seen as taking place before play can begin, a sort of sitting 
around the table reading through the rulebook, but Wirman argues that it is 
necessary throughout the process of play. There needs to be a continuous re-
evaluation of the rules and limits, of what is accepted – not a one-off contract. 
Continual consent is an integral part of play itself. Since companion species by 
definition spend time around humans and build communication, it is easy to 
understand how it is harder to play with other species that are not considered 
companion species, even when one or both of the parties have the intent to play. 
We play with animals without them necessarily playing with us. Polo, for 
example, is a sport played by humans on top of horses as vehicles. I am no polo 
expert, but I doubt that many people consider the horses to be playing. But what 
happens if we can afford some agency to the horses? What if this is the only time 
of the day they are allowed out of their stalls, and they are playing by following 
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the rules (as many game scholars hold as the utmost importance to games), 
which are to obey the human on top of it as much as possible? 
Humans also make animals play by setting human-made technology in 
front of them, participating in the play themselves as a viewer of the 
performance. There are many mobile apps for cats to catch faux-fish. Wirman 
ran a study observing orangutans playing with iPads and found that the physical 
presence of the iPad itself was the play object more than the digital game. She 
also noted that the iPad became a tool for play between the humans running the 
study and the orangutans (n.p.). 
In the paragraphs above, I assumed that dogs, cats, orangutans can play 
and hypothesized that horses can play. Below is a list of species. I encourage you 
to highlight or draw a checkmark beside the species that you think are capable 
of play:  
Human infants 
Cats 
Hamsters 
Apes 
Tigers 
Birds 
Crocodiles 
Bats 
Goldfish 
Ants 
Lobsters 
Oysters 
Mushrooms 
Was there a clear point between species in which you imagine can play and cannot 
play?  
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Maybe all animals can play but not insects? What are the qualities that a 
species needs in order to play? How do we know humans have these qualities? 
When I asked my undergraduate class these questions, the most common 
responses were consciousness, sense of self, and agency. The species must be 
able to understand itself in relation to the world. There has to be a sense of 
individuality. These answers made sense coming from burgeoning game scholars 
and designers because play is often predicated on being able to choose: choose 
to participate, choose different actions and different ways of influencing the 
world. These qualities need to be unpacked in relation to the boundaries of the 
human.  
“Human” is not a distinct and unchanging category. The definition of 
personhood and humanness shift over time according to whom the structuring 
powers consider deserving of human status. Mental capacity is often a 
prerequisite for being considered human. “Rational thought” and “complex 
thinking” are common differentiations between animals and humans, but that 
leaves many people with mental disorders in a liminal space. As affect theorist 
Jasbir Puar points out, the borders of the human rely on ableist and racist 
discourses (156). Those who cannot communicate in what is thought to be the 
central human mode of communication (linear verbal language) do not meet the 
qualifications. She argues that “the inability to ‘communicate’ functions as the 
single determinant of mental or cognitive impairment (thereby regulating the 
human/animal distinction), thus destabilizing the centrality of the human 
capacity for thought and cognition” (156). There are people who cannot speak 
verbally but communicate in other forms like sign language, and there are some 
who do not have motor function or verbal capacity, commonly and 
problematically referred to as “vegetables.” Yet we know other species 
communicate, sometimes verbally like whales, dolphins, dogs, but also non-
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verbally like ants, plants, and whole forests. We humans, especially us academic 
humans, have disregarded non-verbal, non-linear communication.  
In her book, Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation, artist and 
disability scholar Sunaura Taylor “crips” animal ethics, seeing affinities between 
animal suffering and oppression of people with disabilities. The distinctions 
between able bodies and minds and disabled bodies and minds are dependent on 
the constructed distinctions between the human and the non-human, both in 
terms of language and able-mindedness but also in terms of bodies and their 
capabilities: 
Ableism allows us to view human abilities as unquestionably superior to animal 
abilities; it propels our assumptions that our own human movements, thought 
processes, and ways of being are always not only more sophisticated than 
animals’ but in fact give us value… Certain abilities and capacities are central 
to definitions of the human; they are thought to mark the boundaries between 
humanity and the rest of the animal world. In this way ableism gives shape to 
what and who we think of as human versus animal. (59)  
This division informs what lives are considered worth living and worth providing 
care for. Taylor writes that “ableist values are central to animal industries, where 
the dependency, vulnerability, and presumed lack of emotional awareness or 
intellectual capacity of animals creates the groundwork for a system that makes 
billions of dollars in profit off of animal lives” (59). This system of exploitation 
includes the ways humans treat non-human species beyond animals, through 
earth-damaging practices such as mining and fracking.  
Taylor aims to “make clear that the animal, and, consequently, the human, 
are complicated categories, socially determined rather than solely biological” 
(19). The divisions of human and non-human in the biological, too, is socially 
constructed. Vitalist and post-human scholars argue it is actually so much more 
than our DNA that makes us human. Our bodies are three to five pounds of 
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bacteria. There are roughly the same number of bacteria in our bodies are as 
there are human cells (Saey n.p.). This bacteria, the microbiome in particular, 
helps determine our digestion, our mood, how we act, as well as the amount of 
serotonin sent to our brain. Things that we consciously put into our body or that 
leak into our body from our environment, like salts and elements, affect our 
personality. Lithium, for example, is an element that people take as a medication 
for bipolar disorder. It can cause intense difference in not only the way we act 
and feel but who we fundamentally consider ourselves to be. On a larger scale, 
different levels of lithium in water and in food affect the moods of whole towns 
(Fels n.p.). 
In actuality, human beings are interspecies beings. We are multiple. Anna 
Tsing states that “species interdependence is a well-known fact—except when it 
comes to humans”:  
Human exceptionalism blinds us. Science has inherited stories about human 
mastery from the great monotheistic religions. These stories fuel assumptions 
about human autonomy, and they direct questions to the human control of 
nature, on the one hand, or human impact on nature, on the other, rather than 
to species interdependence. (Tsing n.p.) 
This is what Haraway means when she says, “becoming with”—we are not 
separate, we only exist with each other. So then, we, as multiples, are always 
playing as multiples. The bacteria is playing when we are playing because the 
bacteria is us and we could not play without it. The amount of elements in our 
bodies helps determine how we feel about playing.  
What Can Play? 
The following section of this essay interrogates different categories of non-
human and their possibilities of play. It takes up a position of speculative 
thought, imagining the potentiality of the more-than-human against the strict 
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norms that regulate the ways in which we are allowed to think beyond 
anthropocentricism. Although this paper utilizes feminist science studies and 
science and technology studies, it is more in line with new materialism, affect 
theory, and post-human, non-human, and more-than-human inquiry. It is a 
part of the current art movement exploring non-human relationships between 
animals, bacteria, gravity, natural frequencies, and more. This is a political 
movement; to consider the environment and the non-humans as co-creators in 
our art and research is a move towards de-anthropocentricism and signaling the 
need to consider the ways we are relating to the non-human species and the 
environment—primarily destroying it in the service of capitalism. The speculative 
liberties I take are a creative exercise to re-imagine the rules and assumptions 
ingrained in common anthropocentricism in order to move towards new, more 
considerate human-to-non-human relations.  
I pose these questions not to find an absolute answer – as if such a thing 
exists – but to open up potentials for new, unanticipated answers and creative 
speculation. Like Alison Kafer writes in Feminist Queer Crip, “the desire for clear 
answers, free of contradiction and inconsistency, is understandable, but I want to 
suggest that accessible futures require such ambiguities” (19). For the purposes 
of this paper, I would add that this is necessary for imagining experiences beyond 
the non-human that surely are not yet comprehensible to us. Each section takes 
a non-human species and asks, can it play? 
Can Cyborgs Play? 
Cyborgs are built on interspecies multiplicity. Donna Haraway wrote A Cyborg 
Manifesto in 1984 which has since gone on to be incredibly generative in many 
fields. The figure of the cyborg guides people to not be “afraid of their joint 
kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities 
and contradictory standpoints” (154). Rosi Braidotti theorizes the posthuman as 
becoming-machine, describing the enmeshing of “the organic and the inorganic, 
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the born and the manufactured, flesh and metal, electronic circuits and organic 
nervous systems” (89). Our bodies are biomediated, argues Patricia Clough (2). 
Some, like Haraway, make the case we are already cyborg. People wear glasses, 
technology that augments our “natural” bodies. We are very attached, 
figuratively but almost literally, to our phones. They are on our bodies at all 
times, and we even sleep with them. Videogame controllers can be seen as a way 
of cyborging ourselves. In this sense, the technologically mediated portion of 
ourselves actually enables further play. The cyborg is not simply a human playing 
with technology, or humans interacting with technology, but it is – using Karen 
Barad’s terminology – an intra-action between the materials.  
Ants? 
The American Journal of Play interviewed entomologist Mark W. Moffett, titling it 
“Why Don’t Ants Play?”: 
AJP: What would ant behaviour need to look like to qualify as play?  
Moffett: Perhaps the best we might do would be to find an ant increasing her 
skill set through practice. This is poorly investigated but seems plausible. For 
example, a leafcutter ant might grow increasingly skilled at slicing through a 
particular kind of tree foliage and come to prefer collecting more foliage of 
that tree species. Some ant workers are known to return day after day to a 
particular area to forage and get to know the food there very well, which may 
make them more proficient hunters. But such activities seem too functional 
to be called play, and it would certainly be hard to tell when an ant is having 
a good time at doing them. Ants always look so serious about everything, but 
who knows? (n.p.) 
Moffett relies on play as a productive force, serving a role that betters the 
organism – but that betterment has a limit else it becomes labour. We see ants 
as the ultimate labourer. Graeber argues that humans have constructed a 
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hierarchy of frivolous creatures such as dolphins and puppies, but in fact, all 
animals play including “frogs, minnows, salamanders, fiddler crabs, and yes, even 
ants—which not only engage in frivolous activities as individuals, but also have 
been observed since the nineteenth century to arrange mock-wars, apparently 
just for the fun of it” (n.p.). In the interview with Moffett, he inadvertently offers 
a mode of play that ants are observed to take part in: mistakes. He says:  
If you have watched ants long enough, you’ve probably seen one clearly going 
the wrong way. But as long as enough individuals are doing roughly the right 
thing to complete the job, the few who make a bad choice might discover 
things everyone else misses. Mistakes become a form of creativity, as they do 
in human play. Though calling a dumb ant playful would be pushing my luck! 
(n.p.) 
Mistakes and failure have often been cited as a reason why play is an especially 
functional learning tool and medium for social change. Colleen Macklin writes:  
When we fail in a game, it has little real consequence in the world outside the 
game. This is essential to our enjoyment of a game. And another interesting 
thing happens with failure: when we fail we learn something new about the 
game and ourselves … Games provide us with a model world in which iterative 
failure and eventual success becomes the only way to progress and learn how 
its systems work. And failure is a way toward new patterns of thinking. Games 
engage us as active participants in a system, and teach us how the system 
works through the feedback of failure. This is one reason why games can be 
so useful in helping us understand and reflect on the real world. They provide 
a context for experimenting with strategies and attempting to apprehend 
problems through a low-consequence representation—a systemic 
representation. We iterate through strategies and learn from the game as it 
provides us with dynamic feedback. (n.p.) 
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Indeed, failure can be a useful learning tool, but what happens if we stop 
perceiving failure as productive consequence in the “real world” outside of the 
play world and instead look at failure and mistakes as part of the fundamental 
composition of what play itself is? Haraway states that “we play with our 
mistakes; they give us that possibility” (459). 
Moffett is then asked if superorganisms (a unit comprised of a multiplicity 
of organisms) can play, to which Moffett replies: “That’s another way at which 
we could look at the possibilities for play and creativity in ants—not at the 
individual, but at the level of the superorganism. Rather than seeking playfulness 
in individual ants, could it exist in the colony as a whole?” (n.p.). This interview 
with Moffett shows common pitfalls of thinking about play and labour, but it also 
opens up ways we can think about play less as an individual act but as something 
a collective does. Play is a quality that exists between bodies, not necessarily 
residing in a sole individual.  
Plants? 
In 2007, Canadian researchers discovered that a common seashore plant called a 
sea rocket can recognize its siblings—plants grown from seeds from the same 
plant, or mother (WIRED, n.p.). They observed that, when siblings are grown next 
to each other in the soil, they "play nice" and do not send out more roots to 
compete with one another, but as soon as one of the plants is thrown in with 
strangers, it begins competing with them by rapidly growing more roots to take 
up the water and mineral nutrients in the soil. This is just one of the many 
instances of researchers observing the way plant organisms recognize and 
communicate with each other. Anna Tsing’s book The Mushroom at the End of the 
World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins describes the matsutake mushroom 
and its influence on society. She writes: “we are stuck with the problem of living 
despite economic and ecological ruination. Neither tales of progress nor of ruin 
tell us how to think about collaborative survival. It is time to pay attention to 
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mushroom picking. Not that this will save us—but it might open our 
imaginations” (19). She details how the matsutake thrive in alliance and co-
dependence with other species trees, an example of necessary collaborative 
coexistence. In her blogpost Unruly Edges: Mushrooms as Companion Species, she 
expresses that  
[f]or mushroom lovers, the most intriguing interspecies companionship is that 
between fungi and plant roots. In mycorrhiza, the threads of the fungal body 
enter or sheathe the roots of plants. Indian pipes and other plants without 
chlorophyll are supported entirely from the nutrients they gain from fungi in 
their roots; many orchids cannot even germinate without fungal assistance. 
More generally, the fungus obtains sustenance from the plant while offering 
it minerals from the surrounding soil. Fungi can even bore into rocks, making 
their mineral elements available for plant growth. (n.p.) 
She articulates the ways in which mushrooms have influenced the origins of 
family, private property, and the state, arguing that “the presence of fungi often 
tell us the changing practices of being human” (n.p.). Mushrooms have an agency 
and influence in ecosystems and culture.  
There have been art and design projects that take up this question if plants 
can play. Sensobiotics, an installation by Thomas Hawranke, consists of a plant 
hooked up to a game console playing a first person shooter. The reactions of the 
plant to the light from the screen are sent to control the game. At the Refiguring 
Innovation in Games conference in Montréal, Canada in 2016, I partook in Ida 
Toft’s workshop “Cross-Species Game Design,” in which we designed games for 
plants. Toft writes of the workshop:  
The delusional and deceptive efforts of Cross-Species Game Design are driven 
by an urge to, at least try to, explore if it is possible to develop relationships 
beyond extraction, capitalization, neglect, caution, or irreverence. Cross-
Species Game Design intervenes with this interest in thickening relationships 
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to species other than human. Design practice, design thinking and artistic 
practice are the practical strategies. Play, humor and joyful pleasures are the 
parameters for success. (n.p.) 
We discussed hypotheses and creative ideas as well as places of stuck-ness in 
imagining agency for the non-human. What are their desires? Do they feel 
injured if a leaf is pulled off a branch or is it like losing a strand of hair? One 
running theme was “deep time,” which holds the possibility of plants’ differing 
experience of time. Play for plants would take place over months or years. One 
of the games we made was Pac-Plant, a game board for a plant that would sink 
down and spread out, collecting the plant food pellets over a long period of time.  
 
Stone, Kara. Pac-Plant. ReFig Conference, Montreal Canada. November 2016. Personal collection. 
We considered how to allow for agency and consent, not forcing the plants into 
any situation. People designed games that were optional, like a climbing wall that 
is there to be used if desired.  
Bacteria? 
I have mentioned bacteria’s role in allowing humans to play, but what about 
bacteria outside the human body? If we consider play to be experimentation un-
oriented towards a goal, somehow separate or at least dual to our “life drive,” 
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our basic instincts to keep us alive, then maybe bacteria plays as well. Maybe it 
crawls across a certain piece of bread just to see what happens. To be clear, I’m 
not saying that bacteria has a logical thought process of “well, why don’t we jump 
over there and see what happens?” but that there is a force and an agency that 
allows it to sidestep, for a quick moment, the narrative life drive forwards.  
In Lauren Berlant’s essay “Slow Death,” she details the ways in which 
people engage in behaviours that are slowly killing them such as over-eating, 
drinking alcohol, and smoking cigarettes, not because they want to die but 
because they are laterally stepping out of the forward motion of life (qtd. in 
“Cruel Optimism” 107). It is somewhat like the ways videogames are described 
as “escapes” from the real world, yet do damage to our health and wellbeing 
when played a lot – back aches, carpal tunnel syndrome, hunched shoulders, eye 
strain. Why couldn’t bacteria engage in this slow death? Does bacteria not get 
tired of its instruction to keep reproducing? What about parasites and viruses? 
Are they fucking with us? Maybe we are their play objects and they engage in 
cruel BDSM play with our bodies. Maybe all living things play. The mere action of 
living means some sort of communication, an intra-action between cells, objects, 
other bodies.  
Technology? 
Play and humour are often seen as a tipping point of AI and the singularity. In 
the meantime, the programmed playfulness of our assistant bots creates them 
as a sort of companion species. Miguel Sicart writes, in Play Matters, that “Siri has 
a personality: she is quirky, ironic, even a bit dry. Siri is a playful design that 
breaks our expectations and gives personality to software... By being playful, Siri 
becomes a companion more than a tool (45). Play is a programmed quality used 
to mimic life. One of my own games, Sentient Sisters, imagines a future where Siri, 
Alexa, and Microsoft Assistant must be interrogated on their level of cooperation 
with the human species. The interrogation is done through literally asking the 
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aforementioned bots a series of questions and listening to their answers to infer 
their threat level. Though not true artificial intelligence, Sentient Sisters is a game 
playing with bots and allowing for surprise on behalf of the technology. 
To return to the role of speculative imaginings, imagine you believe that 
all animals and insects play, that we are already cyborgs and thus cyborgs play, 
that plants and living matter play. What about inanimate objects? Does 
something have to be alive to play? In an inventive and imaginative take, 
videogame scholar and journalist Cameron Z. Kunzelman argues that videogames 
themselves are alive (61). He asserts an understanding of a videogame not as an 
object to be operated on by a subject, but rather as an assemblage that should 
be referred to as a body, that games as bodies are particularly developed at luring 
in humans, therefore allowing themselves to continue to exist in the world. This 
understanding of “aliveness” requires a rethinking of what “life” entails. He 
writes:  
What I want to do here with the term life, put into a nonhuman configuration 
to produce ‘nonhuman life,’ is to use it as a tool. I do not want to find things 
with qualities which I then decide are alive. Rather, I want to say something 
has life in order to mark an ethical relationship between humans and whatever 
we have designated with life. (61) 
Kunzelman’s thinking is inspired by feminist and new materialist thinkers 
described in the next section.  
Rocks? 
New materialists are questioning what aliveness means. The term “inorganic” is 
used to mean not consisting of or deriving from living matter. Organic means 
alive or has once been alive. Limestone is composed of skeletal fragments of 
marine organisms such as coral and molluscs. This inorganic material is made up 
of organic material, things that were once classified as alive. When does that 
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transition happen? It seems like it rests heavily on some concept of spirit, 
something vitalist scholar Jane Bennett avoids:  
[W]hat I am calling impersonal affect or material vibrancy is not a spiritual 
supplement or "life force" added to the matter said to house it. Mine is not a 
vitalism in the traditional sense; I equate affect with materiality, rather than 
posit a separate force that can enter and animate a physical body. (xiii) 
Bennett puts forth that life is more like matter-movement or matter energy. And 
everything moves. Aliveness is energy and movement and force—something akin 
to agency. We think of objects as passive and stable things, and we humans are 
the active subjects in the world. Bennett wants to dissolve this binary between 
subject and object, showing how garbage, metal, and other materials can all be 
“actants”: “[T]hey have the capacity to “animate, to act, to produce effects 
dramatic and subtle” (6). Objects are alive because of their capacities to make 
difference in the world, to have effects, to shape the web of interrelationships of 
which they are a part. In Mel Chen’s book Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, 
and Queer Affect, language, metals, and sofas become animated through their 
affective force. Chen argues for the term “animacies” rather than a focus on life 
(2). Metals seem like the most lifeless material imaginable, but it makes up the 
chips that make our computers animated, the material that often makes us 
cyborgs. 
Toft, who ran the cross-species game design workshop, created Earth Plays, 
an installation of crystals that played Nintendo games based on their frequency 
output. Viewers watched as the crystals’ avatar walked behind bushes, shot guns 
in random bursts, and patiently waited for enemies to walk by.  
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Toft, Ida. Earth Plays… (installation) ReFig Conference, Montréal, Canada. November 2016. 
Toft writes that “crediting 'Earth' as the player is a way of remembering the very 
material aspects of technology, including an infrastructure of a mining industry 
that extracts raw materials from the planet’s outer layers” (n.p.). I am not arguing 
that these crystals were consciously playing videogames designed for humans; 
Toft’s work is a creative, thought-provoking imagining. I am arguing that the 
affective force that can develop play can be present in non-human life-forms, 
and that not all play will look like human play.  
Atoms? 
Graeber asserts that electrons have free will. That is what determines their 
random jumps:  
If an electron is acting freely...it can only be acting freely as an end in itself. 
Which would mean that at the very foundations of physical reality, we 
encounter freedom for its own sake—which also means we encounter the most 
rudimentary form of play. (n.p.) 
The randomness of the universe is actually play, then. The minutiae of the world 
plays. Play is everywhere, in everything. He puts forth the following question 
“what would happen if we proceeded from the reverse perspective and agreed to 
treat play not as some peculiar anomaly, but as our starting point, a principle 
already present not just in lobsters and indeed all living creatures, but also on 
every level where we find what physicists, chemists, and biologists refer to as 
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“self-organizing systems”? Even the entomologist Mark W. Moffett who did not 
believe individual ants could play describes evolution as a kind of play – “one 
with life and death consequences” – of experimentation and mistakes.  
Play 
In her book Critical Play, Flanagan deftly summarizes key theorists' definitions of 
play, primarily Huizinga and Sutton-Smith, and proposes the following 
generalizations: play is (1) “generally a voluntary act, offers pleasure in its own 
right (and by its own rules),” (2) “is mentally or physically challenging,” (3) “and 
is separated from reality, either through a sanctioned play space or through an 
agreed upon fantasy or rule set” (5). Having read this far into the paper, you may 
guess where I see faults in these definitions in relating them to affect studies, 
disability studies, and the non-human:  
(1) If we are to consider how non-humans play, from dogs to bacteria, the 
notion of “voluntary” needs to be deconstructed as it relates to a belief in self-
fulfilling direct agency. This will be expanded on in the next section of the 
paper. Instead of the word “pleasurable,” a term like affective may be more 
accurate. As recent game scholars and journalists have already shown, games 
do not need to be fun or pleasurable, but they do participate in an emotional 
and affective circulation. This change from pleasurable to affective opens up 
play to non-human actors who may not feel pleasure in the way we expect but 
do have the capacity to affect and be affected.  
(2) The requirement that play must be mentally or physically challenging may 
work to exclude those with mental and physical disabilities. Can it not be 
pleasurable (to return to that term for a moment) to do something that does 
not push oneself, that is within one’s capacity, just for the sake of the 
experience?  
(3) Fundamental to this paper is the argument that play does not need to be 
outside of ordinary life. It makes up ordinary life. It is not just videogames on 
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our phones, streaming culture, and gamification that blur the boundaries of 
the magic circle but that play is deeply embedded in our actions and 
interactions.  
When considering more-than-humans, the concept of play needs to be 
expanded. It is not just an ability humans and certain species have that provides 
some social function. Play is an affective force. It is experimentation, 
improvisation, failure, trying again. It is a movement between bodies. Play can 
also be an outlook, a mode of interpreting the world. Playfulness is key to 
speculative, imaginative relationships between humans and more-than-humans.  
Re-Centering the Human 
What should we, the multiplicity that makes up the category of human, do with 
all this esoteric hypothesizing? As Haraway puts it, in Staying with the Trouble, 
It matters with which ways of living and dying we cast our lot rather than 
others. It matters not just to human beings, but also to those many critters 
across taxa which and whom we have subjected to exterminations, extinctions, 
genocides, and prospects of futurelessness. Like it or not, we are in the string 
figure game of caring for and with precarious worldings made terribly more 
precarious by fossil-burning man making new fossils as rapidly as possible in 
orgies of the Anthropocene and Capitalocene. Diverse human and nonhuman 
players are necessary in every fibre of the tissues of the urgently needed 
Cthulucene story. (55) 
This section of her book speaks to the importance of tenderness with each other, 
different species, and the planet. Interdependence can cause care for other things. 
There is political significance in what we choose to care for. At risk of forcing play 
to be productive, a critique I started this paper with, I move to reconsider 
anthropocentrism in game studies and design in order to induce socially 
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progressive change in our ideas on choice and agency, materiality, and the 
multiplayer.  
Game studies focuses on interactivity between a variety of actors but 
mostly between technology and human mind. T.L. Taylor’s The Assemblage of Play 
helps to understand the range of actors, “system, technologies, player, body, 
community, company, legal structures that make up the play moment” (332). 
She describes an example of a World of Warcraft mod that became a 41st player in 
the raid. The non-human software is a co-player. Taylor uses the term 
“assemblage” as it relates to actor network theory, but I invoke the term as it is 
used by affect and more-than-human scholars such as Puar and Haraway, who 
proffer “the notion that bodies are unstable assemblages that cannot be 
seamlessly disaggregated into identity formations” (n.p.). This list of actors and 
co-players can be opened up to feelings, bacteria, metal, antidepressants, and 
plant matter. Viewing play as an assemblage between surfaces means we need to 
rethink the agency of the player.  
The ability to choose is popularly held as one of the defining features of 
games, but within a post-human framework, we can recognize that nothing acts 
alone. Bennett writes that “any action is always a trans-action, and any act is 
really but an initiative that gives birth to a cascade of legitimate and bastard 
progeny” (101). Our agency is not as sovereign, separate bodies but as actants 
immersed in a complex assemblage. Bennett introduces the concept of 
distributive agency, which “does not posit a subject as the root cause of an 
effect.” She distinguishes distributive agency from traditions that define agency 
as a moral capacity linked to “an advance plan or an intention” (101). With this 
concept, we can rethink designing games not just for us humans influencing the 
game and wielding our control over it, but the game influencing us with 
unexpected outcomes from the intermingling of bodily actants.  
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We need to consider the materials we use and how they affect the player. 
Holding plastic is going to affect players differently than holding a flower. We 
can mobilize what Bennett calls “thing-power,” the “ability of inanimate things 
to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle” (6). It can make us 
design much more affective/effective art and design projects that can 
communicate through a broader array of emotions.  
Most games are made for white, straight, cisgendered, upper-middle-class 
men, but designers and scholars consider how mentally or physically disabled 
people can play games; ways in which nature can be incorporated into our daily 
lives in the city through play for an environmental cause; how play can bring us 
closer to animals, for calm, peace, animal rights, or just for fun. Considering the 
non-human can lead us to imagine ways in which we can design for the positive 
inter-relation of people and species. Play can become less an individual-to-
individual action but something that happens in communion and togetherness. 
If we think of ourselves as interspecies beings, as a multiplicity, and view all other 
species as companions (not just the ones that live in our homes or in our bodies), 
social repercussions abound, even outside of designing videogames. To be very 
blunt: individualism is destructive. It is what makes the wealth disparity so large 
that a few people have too much and many people are dying. It makes us not 
care about the treatment of disabled and debilitated people. It makes us not care 
about animal rights, garbage pits, or the future of the planet. It is necessary to 
think about the welfare of others: other people, other animals, the earth and 
everything on it and in it —even when playing games, making games, and 
critiquing games.
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